But the very idea of mental causation has long been thought problematic, and has recently been challenged by a nuinber of new arguments. In their general outline, these arguments go like this. A cause has its effects only in virtue of some of its properties. When I bum my hand on a red hot poker, it is not the colour of the poker that causes the burn, but its heat. So when a mental cause has some effect, we can ask: does it have this effect in virtue of its mental properties, or in virtue of its non-mental properties? Is the mentality of the mental cause 'efficacious' in producing its effect? The opponents of mental causation argue that it is not. But if the mental properties of these causes are inefficacious, then there is strictly speaking no genuinely mental causation. Our thoughts and sensations never literally make things happen.
If there is no mental causation, then Functionalism's causal conception of mental reality is mistaken. So it is crucial for Functionalists to understand why mental causes are supposed not to have their effects in virtue of their mental properties.
In the recent literature, a number of distinct assumptions have been offered in support of this claim. 1 They are:
(1) The Anomalism of the Mental: the mental is not subject to laws, neither to purely mental laws nor to mental-physical laws.
It is generally accepted that the existence of a causal relation between A and B entails that A and B fall under some law. So on the face of it, if there are no mental laws, then there is no mental causation.
(2) The Being a mousetrap is a functional property which may be 'realised' by e.g. an arrangement of wood, springs and cheese. It is not the mousetrapness of the mousetrap which is responsible for its effects, but the 'realising' properties of the wood, the spring etc. Likewise, it is claimed, with mental properties-if they are functional properties.
(4) The Inefficacy of the Semantic: the 'semantic' properties of mental states cannot be responsible for the effects of those states.
When I think about Chicago, the 'semantic' properties of my thought are those in virtue of which it represents Chicago. But how can the fact that something represents something else have any effects? Nothing short of magic, it seems, could get a relation in which I stand to Chicago to be immediately responsible for what I do here in London.
Some of these assumptions are related, though not in a very straightforward way. Assuming that causes need laws and that the mental-physical distinction is exhaustive, then assumption (1), the Anomalism of the Mental, obviously entails (2), the Causal Closure of the Physical. But (1) does not entail (3), the Inefficacy of the Functional: one could hold that functional properties are efficacious, as long as none of them are mental. (1) does, however, entail (4), the Inefficacy of the Semantic, on the assumption that all semantic properties are, or derive from, mental properties.
Assumption (2), the Causal Closure of the Physical, does not entail (1): one can believe in non-causal mental laws. Nor does (2) entail (3): one could believe that there are efficacious functional physical properties. But (2) does entail (4), again on the assumption that all semantic properties are mental.
Assumnption (3), the Inefficacy of the Functional, does not entail (1) for the same reason that (2) doesn't-even if all mental properties are functional. And (3) does not entail (2), on the usual meaning of 'physical': one could hold that some physical effects have sufficient non-functional and non-physical causes. Neither does (3) entail (4), since the semantic may not be functional.
Finally, assumption (4), the Inefficacy of the Semantic, does not entail (1), if only because not all mental states are semantic. (4) does not entail (2), since non-semantic mental states (e.g. sensations) may be efficacious. And (4) does not entail (3), since many functional properties are not semantic. So (1) entails (2) and (4) on reasonable assumptions, and (2) entails (4), but apart from that, the four assumptions are logically independent. What this means is that there is not one problem of mental causation-there are a number, some of which are unrelated to the others.
In the rest of this paper, I will critically examine these assumptions. Since I have elsewhere argued against (1) and (2), my aim here is not so much to refute them but to show exactly what is involved in accepting them. This will take up section II. I will then offer arguments against (3) in section III, in the course of providing a better understanding of Functionalism.
The upshot is that the friend of mental causation need not be troubled by (l)-(3). But (4) does give rise to a genuine problem of mental causation, and in section 
and (b) causation is a relation solely between particulars. It is the nominalist doctrine, (a)
, that makes Davidsonians say that mental events are not mental because they have some mental property-they are mental because they are described as such. And it is (b) that makes them say that the same particular cause can be correctly described in different ways, as mental or as physical. Although I would dispute both these doctrines, I shall not do so here. Instead I shall focus on the crucial denial of properties. If there are no properties, then causation cannot depend on them. We cannot literally say, as I did in section I, that a cause has its effects in virtue of certain of its properties. But few facts about causation seem more obvious than this.5 So if we do insist that causation depends on properties, then it turns out that the chief problem with Davidson's Anomalous Monism is not, as most critics claim, that it admits inefficacious mental properties, but that it does not admit mental properties at all.
Moreover, if causation does depend on properties, then we should also reject Davidson's doctrine (b) that it is a relation solely between particulars. The obvious alternative is to see causation as a relation between complex entities, particulars having properties.
We can call these entities facts, and the properties the constituents of the facts.6 It will not matter here which account of facts we adopt, since for the purposes of this discussion all that matters is that insofar as they are causes, facts have properties as constituents.
But what should we say about properties? Since most causal relations between facts hold independently of our discovery of them, a property cannot simply be explained in terms of the semantic value of a predicate (see Lewis 1983 , Mellor 1991 all the predicates in a language pick out real properties than there is to think all singular terms pick out real particulars. Too few because there will be many properties that are not yet picked out by any predicate. I cannot address the question of how we know when a real property is picked out by a predicate-except to say that it is not generally an a priori matter, any more than it is with singular terms and particulars. We learn of the existence of most properties empirically: through the effects on us of the facts of which they are constituents.
On this view, then, a mental cause is a fact with a mental property as constituent. Thinking of causation in this non-Davidsonian way certainly leaves no obstacles to mental causation. But if assumption (2) is right, then physical causes always suffice. So barring causal overdetermination, the mental reduces to the physical, or 'supervenes'upon it, or is wholly inefficacious (see Papineau 1990 ).
But it is not at all obvious why we should believe in (2). Essentially the problem is that the definition of 'physical' in (2) gives rise to a dilemma. Either the thesis that all physical effects have sufficient physical causes just is a definition of 'physical', in which case the the physical is the causal in a quite trivial sense. Or the 'physical' means the properties incorporated in the laws of physics proper, in which case (2) rules out perfectly adequate causes-for instance, biological causes-simply because they are not studied by physics.
But I have pursued this claim elsewhere, so I shall not repeat its details here.7 My aim in this section has been to spell out just what the defenders of (1) and (2) are committed to, and to suggest how implausible these commitments are. Defenders of (1) must adopt the doctrines (a) and (b) above; and defenders of (2) will find themselves impaled on one of the horns of the above dilemma. To desire that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that P in a world in which one's beliefs, whatever they are, were true. To believe that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one's desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together with one's other beliefs) were true. Though they do, in a sense, define beliefs and desires, the clauses in the Rarmrsey Sentence need not all be known a priori. For we can find out more about these mental states by empirical investigation-facts about which introspective commonsense does not always deliver clear and unequivocal opinions. For instance, the complete Ramsey Sentence might tell us that beliefs need not be conscious, or that beliefs and desires come by degrees. These features of beliefs and desires need not be accessible to a priori conceptual analysis alone.
It might seem, therefore, that Functionalism is invulnerable to the problems of mental causation, since the functional roles specified in the complete Ramsey Sentence will include the typical effects of mental states, and therefore presuppose that they have causal powers. So if the Ramsey Sentence is true, then mental causation is vindicated.
But assumption (3) says that functional properties are inefficacious (see Jackson and Pettit 1990, p. 201). The idea is that a functional property has to be 'realised' by some non-functional property in order for it to have any impact on the world. As Block puts it, Functional properties are properties that consist in the having of some properties or other (say non-functional properties) that have certain causal relations to one another and to inputs and outputs. In the production of these outputs, it is the non-functional properties that are standardly the causally relevant ones, not the functional properties. (Block 1990, p. 155) This is why although a mousetrap is functionally characterised-as a device that takes unsuspecting live mice as input and yields dead mice as output-it is the properties that 'realise the mousetrap', or 'occupy the mousetrap-role', that are efficacious in these murderous transactions. If this is right, and mental properties are functional properties, then they have no effects in their own right-they need causal ratification by some other non-functional property.
This claim seems obviously true of mousetraps. But given the fact that properties are discovered a posteriori, the fact that the mousetrap's 'mousetrapness' has no effects might just mean that there is no such property as being a mousetrap. The objection has to show what general feature of real functional properties prohibits them from being efficacious. So can the argument be shown to work against all functional properties, and therefore against mental properties as conceived by Functionalism?
The argument needs the distinction between functional and nonfunctional properties (or between 'role' and 'occupant'/'realiser' properties) to be a distinction in nature. If there is a problem about the efficacy of functional properties, it should not arise just because of the way we happen to describe the property in question.
But it turns outthat often whether aproperty is 'functional'depends precisely on the theoretical vocabulary chosen to define it. To borrow a nice example of Mark Wilson 's, if Newtonian physics is formulated in the vocabulary of Newton's Principia ('F=ma' etc.) then potential energy is functionally defined. But in Hamiltonian or Lagrangian formulations of physics, potential energy is a primitive notion, and the primitives of Principia (e.g. gravitationalforce) come out as functionally defined. So the question arises: is a s8ystem's potential energy a functional property of that system or not?
To explain away compelling examples like these, the defender of (3) needs to provide a principle that identifies essentially functional properties: those properties that are essentially characterised in terms of the typical behaviour of the things that have them. We would then know which properties stand in need of causal ratification by non-functional properties. Since, as Jackson and Pettit observe (Jackson and Pettit 1990, p. 203, properties essentially characterised by the behaviour their possession produces are dispositional properties, what we need is a principle that distinguishes the essentially dispositional from the essentially non-dispositional.
But there is no such principle.9 All the characteristic features of dispositions are possessed by the properties we identify as their 'categorical bases'. The theoretical descriptions that we give of these properties will include or entail conditionals that specify the difference that having these properties makes to the things that have them. Even a paradigmatically 'structural' or 'categorical' property such as mass is characterised, inter alia, in terms of the difference that its instantiation makes to a body's acceleration under a given force. But this is just to say that having a certain mass is characterised in terms of a disposition: in terms of what an object with that mass would do, if certain things were done to it. This does not mean that dispositions do not have 'bases'. It's just that these bases only need be other dispositions. Rather than thinking of the base of a disposition, D, as a property, P, of an entirely other kind that 'realises' the disposition, we should think of P as just another property nomologically secured by the This claim can be illustrated by comparing mental properties with a property whose causal powers ought to be unproblematic: the property temperature. The traditional type-identity theory claimed that the identity-statement 'temperature = mean molecular kinetic energy' is an analogy for the identity of mental properties and brain properties. The standard objection is that mental properties, unlike temperatures, can be 'variably realised' from creature to creature-so a given mental property cannot be identical with one brain property.
But it has not been sufficiently recognised that the identity theory's claim about temperature is false. As Patricia Churchland points out, the temperature of gases is one sort of affair (mean kinetic energy of constituent molecules), but the temperature of a plasma cannot be the same. since a plasma is constituted not by molecules but by sub-atomic particles; the temperature of solids is different yet again, and so also is the temperature of empty space as embodied in its background black-body radiation. (Churchland 1982 pp.
101-102)10
So temperatures, like mental states, are variably realised across substances. Someone might conclude from this that temperatures are, contrary to appearances, inefficacious. But this is a hopeless manoeuvre. For the molecules whose mean kinetic energy 'realises' the temperature of a gas are in their turn 'realised' by atoms, and the atoms 'realised' by sub-atomic particles. And the mean kinetic energy itself will be 'variably realised' in different kinds of gases. On what principle, then, do we decide that one 'realising' level is the level of efficacious properties? Or are there, once again, no efficacious properties?
The answer is of course to block the regress by denying that the efficacy of temperature is undermined by these other microscopic facts about it. We should therefore draw two important morals from the temperature analogy. First, the property temperature cannot be identical with any of the realising properties. Second, and more relevant here, the fact that a mental property is 'variably realised' cannot render that property inefficacious, since parity of reasoning would falsely show that temperatures and other variably realised physical properties are inefficacious.
We would I think that this problem of the efficacy of content is the most troubling fact about intentionality. Intentionality is often described as mysterious-but mystery alone does not create a philosophical problem. The reason intentionality is so mysterious is that it seems to make the causal powers of beliefs and desires impossible. So the problem of intentionality is predominantly a causal problem: to solve the problem is to show how intentional states have the causal powers we know they have.
The first step in a solution, it seems to me, must show that each intentional state needs some intrinsic feature or features that serve as the mechanism for its interactions with other states, and ultimately with actions. These intrinsic features will be the local causal surrogates for the contents of the states. The Ramsey Sentence for intentional states will therefore need supplementing with specifications of these surrogate properties. I shall not say much here about what these surrogates are like, except that they need not be physical properties-though they may be. They just need to be intrinsic. Although there is nothing wrong with using the term 'syntax' in this way, it will mislead if it is not distinguished from syntax in a more specific sense. In this sense, an intentional state has syntactic structure iff it has non-semantic properties whose causal behaviour 'mirrors' the semantic structure of the state's content. So if I desire coffee and I think that this is coffee in front of me, the causal process involving these two states involves two representations which are tokens of the same semantic 'coffee'-type, and of the same syntactic type too.
It is this sense of 'syntactic' which the LOT hypothesis is more usually taken as intending. And obviously, the claim that there is mental syntax in this sense is a substantial empirical hypothesis. which the argument of section IV does not entail.1 1 For it is by no means incoherent to suppose that the local causal surrogates of states with the same content have very little in common apart from the fact that they are surrogates for the same contents.
In Would the causal efficacy of beliefs and desires be undermined by the truth of this sort of Connectionist theory? Does the truth of folk psychology require mental syntax? There are many complex issues surrounding these questions, which I cannot address in this brief discussion. But I do think that on the Functionalist picture outlined-'realism all the way up'-the short answer is: no. For the efficacy of beliefs and desires, on this picture, depends on the truth of their Ramsey Sentence. In section IV, I argued that the Ramsey Sentence for beliefs and desires will involve reference to local causal surrogates for their contents. But that is simply an extra claim about the causal structure of the beliefs and desires themselves. The existence of the surrogates does not eliminate the beliefs and desires from the Ramsey Sentence, and it does not undermine their efficacy. It is just an extra fact about them.
We do not yet know whether the structure of the surrogates-the mechanism of thought-is syntactic or Connectionist, or a bit of both. This is one of the most important questions addressed by contemporary cognitive science. But the present point is that nothing in the idea of these surrogates rules out their having a Connectionist structure. So nothing in what we now know of the Ramsey Sentence for beliefs and desires entails that Connectionism is false.12 Department of Philosophy University College London Gower Street London WCIE 6BT
